Disclosure of Presentence Reports in Capital Cases by Mouton, John A., III
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 38 | Number 1
Fall 1977
Disclosure of Presentence Reports in Capital Cases
John A. Mouton III
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
John A. Mouton III, Disclosure of Presentence Reports in Capital Cases, 38 La. L. Rev. (1977)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol38/iss1/13
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
alternatives. It is uncertain upon what factors the court will rely in
weighing the alternatives if more than one is shown, since, in the instant
case, the court found that the majority stockholders had not shown a
legitimate business purpose for their actions and thus did not reach the
question of less harmful alternative courses of action.
Homer Doster Melton III
DISCLOSURE OF PRESENTENCE REPORTS IN CAPITAL CASES
After petitioner was convicted of first degree murder, a separate
hearing was held before the trial jury' to determine whether the sentence to
be imposed would be the death penalty or life imprisonment. After hearing
testimony offered by the defendant, the jury recommended imposition of a
life sentence, finding that the mitigating circumstances outweighed those
in aggravation of the offense. 2 The trial judge, however, disregarded this
recommendation and entered a judgment sentencing the petitioner to
death, relying on evidence presented at both stages of the bifurcated
proceeding, arguments of counsel and information contained in a pre-
sentence report.' On appeal to the Florida Supreme Court,4 petitioner
contended that it was error to consider the presentence report in imposing
the death penalty. The per curiam decision expressed no opinion on this
argument, but instead recited the trial judge's findings and affirmed the
sentence, 5 over the dissent of two justices who noted that the record on
appeal did not appear to include the confidential portion of the report. The
United States Supreme Court, in reversing, held that petitioner had been
deprived of due process of law when the death sentence was imposed, at
1. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West Supp. 1976-77), which requires a
sentencing hearing in all capital cases.
2. The statute enumerates the circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of
the crime which may be considered in determining the sentence to be imposed.
After considering these, the jury must return an advisory verdict, based on whether
there are aggravating circumstances and whether there are sufficient mitigating
circumstances to outweigh any aggravating circumstances found. The judge is not
bound by this advisory verdict. Id.
3. Neither petitioner nor his counsel was given a complete copy of the pre-
sentence report, nor had such a copy been requested by counsel.
4. Gardner v. State, 313 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1975).
5. Id. at 676-77.
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least in part, on the basis of information which he had no chance to rebut.
Gardner v. Florida, 97 S. Ct. 1197 (1977).
Capital punishment has, in recent years, become a particularly dif-
ficult problem for the Supreme Court. In the landmark decision of Furman
v. Georgia,6 a narrowly divided Court considered Georgia's statute call-
ing for discretionary jury verdicts and concluded in a per curiam opinion
that "the imposition and carrying out of the dealth penalty in these cases
constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments." 7 Each of the nine Justices filed his own opin-
ion, explaining why the cases should or should not be reversed. Justices
Douglas, Stewart, and White each found the manner in which the death
penalty was imposed to be violative of the eighth amendment, 8 while
Justices Brennan and Marshall went further, claiming that the death
penalty itself was "cruel and unusual." 9 The four dissenters were of the
opinion that the Court was going beyond its powers in deciding the issue
on the basis of moral values and the efficacy of the punishment.' 0
Following the decision in Furman, legislative bodies made attempts
to reinstate the death penalty in an acceptable form, thus forcing the Court
to turn its attention once again to the constitutionality of capital punish-
ment provisions. In 1976, the Court decided five cases dealing with death
sentences meted out under new state laws. Again, the Court was unable
6. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
7. Id. at 239-40.
8. Justice Douglas, relying primarily on the equal protection clause, found that
the discretionary death penalty statutes served as a vehicle for unlawful discrimina-
tion against minority groups. Id. at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring). He declined,
however, to reach the issue of the unconstitutionality per se of the sentence of
death. Justice Stewart also refused to reach this question, but noted that there is a
difference between the death penalty and all other forms of punishment, "not in
degree but in kind." Id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring), and concluded that the
eighth and fourteenth amendments could not tolerate capital punishment where it
was "so wantonly and so freakishly imposed." Id. at 310. Justice White observed
the penalty from the state's point of view and stated that "the penalty is so
infrequently imposed that the threat of execution is too attenuated to be of substan-
tial service to criminal justice." Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
9. Justice Brennan's conclusion was based on a purported rejection of the
punishment by contemporary American society and on his belief that the death
penalty is no more effective than a term of years in advancing penal purposes. Id. at
305 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Marshall's opinion presented the most ex-
haustive statistical analysis of the subject and determined that "there is no rational
basis for concluding that capital punishment is not excessive." Id. at 369 (Marshall,
J., concurring).
10. Id. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Id. at 414 (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
Id. at 418 (Powell, J., dissenting); d. at 467 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
1I. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
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to reach a majority opinion, and each of the Justices felt compelled to
express his own views in at least one of the decisions. Justices Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens combined in each case to express the opinion of the
Court, while other Justices filed concurring or dissenting opinions.
Perhaps the most important of these decisions is Gregg v. Georgia,"
2
for in it the Court resolved the issue of the constitutionality of the death
penalty per se. Basing its decision on the historical acceptance of the
punishment,' 3 the apparent continued acceptance by the public, 4 its deter-
rent and retributive functions,' 5 and the belief that the death penalty is not
invariably disproportionate to the crime,' 6 the plurality held that the death
penalty may be imposed under appropriate circumstances. 7 The Court
concluded that the scheme employed by Georgia had eliminated the faults
enunciated in Furman, particularly the unbridled discretion allowed in the
earlier statutes. 18
Different results were reached, however, in Woodson v. North
Carolina' 9 and Roberts v. Louisiana.2 Both North Carolina and Louisia-
U.S. 280 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S.
242 (1976); and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). For an excellent study of
Furman v. Georgia and these five cases, see Note, 52 NOTRE DAME LAw. 261
(1976).
12. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
13. Id. at 176-78. The Court pointed to the fact that capital punishment had
been in existence at the time the Constitution was adopted, and that, since then, the
Court on several occasions had upheld different forms of execution. See Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947); In re
Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
14. 428 U.S. at 179-82. The Court noted that, since its decision in Furman,
thirty-five states and Congress had reinstated the death penalty. However, the
Court failed to note that only one state did not have the death penalty before
Furman, "perhaps indicating a renewal and updating of penal codes rather than an
overwhelming mandate from the public." Note, 1976 DET. C. OF L. REV. 645, 654.
15. 428 U.S. at 183-86. The plurality refused to find retribution as an improper
consideration in imposing sentence, though it did note that it was not the primary
objective or purpose of criminal law. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248
(1949). The Court was inconclusive as to the deterrent effect of capital punishment,
but felt it to be a decision for the legislature.
16. 428 U.S. at 187.
17. id.
18. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) was decided on the same grounds
as Gregg, as the Florida statutory scheme closely paralleled the plan implemented in
Georgia. The same result was also reached in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976),
although the Texas penalty scheme was somewhat different. In each of these
decisions, the Chief Justice and Justices White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist concurr-
ed, while Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented.
19. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
20. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
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na had responded to Furman by imposing mandatory death penalties for
narrowly defined categories of crimes.2 The plurality opinions pointed to
the "constitutional vice of mandatory death sentence statutes-lack of
focus on the circumstances of the particular offense and the character and
propensities of the offender ...... 22 Justice Stewart noted that manda-
tory death sentences have been rejected throughout history as "unduly
harsh and unworkably rigid." 23
Thus, the problems with capital punishment are far from over. Hav-
ing determined that the death penalty is not per se "cruel and unusual,"
the Court must further define the procedural framework under which the
penalty may be imposed without violating the principles announced in
Furman.
One of the procedural problems which has troubled courts and legal
scholars involves the presentence report and the defendant's ability to
learn its contents. In Williams v. New York,24 petitioner had challenged
the imposition of the death penalty on due process grounds, alleging that
the trial judge had improperly considered information contained in a
presentence report, even though the factual details of the report had been
read to the petitioner in open court. Justice Black, writing for the majority,
held that the trial judge had not erred in considering the information,
although it could not have been admitted as evidence at trial .25 Almost
21. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-17 (Supp.
1975).
22. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 333.
23. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 293. Justice Stewart adds: "While
a mandatory death penalty statute may reasonably be expected to increase the
number of persons sentenced to death, it does not fulfill Furman's basic require-
ment by replacing arbitrary and wanton jury discretion with objective standards to
guide, regularize, and make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sen-
tence of death." Id. at 303.
Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred in both decisions, each on the basis
of his own dissent in Gregg v. Georgia, while Justice Blackmun dissented in both
for the reasons he set forth in his dissent in Furman. Justice Rehnquist filed a
lengthy dissent in Woodson, stating his disagreement with the introduction of what
appeared to him to be due process procedural guarantees into the eighth amend-
ment. Id. at 324. Justice White filed a long dissent in Roberts, stating that he was
unwilling to equate jury nullification (in this case the power to convict the defend-
ant of a lesser offense in defiance of the court instruction, where the evidence
clearly supported the greater) with the unlimited discretion of pre-Furman statutes.
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. at 347.
24. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
25. Justice Black, after noting the great importance of the presentence report to
the sentencing judge, added: "We must recognize that most of the information now
19771
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twenty years later, in Specht v. Patterson,26 Justice Douglas began his
opinion by stating that the holding of Williams was that the due process
clause did not require a judge to hold a sentencing hearing in which the
defendant is given an opportunity to participate.27 The Court went on,
however, to distinguish Williams and to hold that a defendant sentenced
under a Sex Offenders Act must be allowed a presentence hearing at which
he can confront the witnesses against him and offer his own evidence. 28
Following the apparent lead of the Supreme Court in Williams and
Specht, the federal courts of appeals have been virtually unanimous in
stating that it is not a violation of due process for a defendant to be denied
access to his presentence report, and have held that the decision to allow
the defendant to see all or part of the report is within the trial judge's
discretion. 29 In some decisions the sentence was vacated, 30 although no
relied upon by judges to guide them in the intelligent imposition of sentences would
be unavailable if information were restricted to that given in open court by witnesses
subject to cross-examination. And the modern probation report draws on informa-
tion concerning every aspect of a defendant's life. The type and extent of this
information make totally impractical if not impossible open court testimony with
cross-examination. Such a procedure could endlessly delay criminal administration
in a retrial of collateral issues." Id. at 250 (emphasis supplied) (footnote omitted).
See text at note 37, infra.
26. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
27. Id. at 606.
28. As explained by Justice Douglas, under the Sex Offenders Act, persons
convicted under one statute, but not sentenced under it, may be sentenced under
another which is brought into play where the judge feels those persons constitute a
threat to the public, are habitual offenders, or are mentally ill. Under the Sex
Offenders Act, the judge may impose an indeterminate sentence of one day to life.
Id. at 607. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-13-201-216 (1973). The basis for
the distinction in Specht was that the sentencing under the Sex Offenders Act was
not based on the commission of a specific crime, but upon evidence concerning
whether the defendant fits into one of the above categories. Justice Douglas pointed
out that this was a new finding of fact that was not an "ingredient of the offense
charged." Id. at 608. Thus, the defendant is entitled to a full hearing with counsel,
and an opportunity to confront witnesses and offer evidence. Id. at 610.
29. See Davis v. United States, 527 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 953 (1976); United States v. Horsley, 519 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 944 (1976); United States v. Pugh, 509 F.2d 766 (8th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Murphy, 497 F.2d 126 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Gardner,
480 F.2d 929 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 977 (1973); United States v. Dreer,
457 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Dockery, 447 F.2d 1178 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S 950 (1971); Baker v. United States, 388 F.2d 931 (4th Cir.
1968).
30. See United States v. Robin, 545 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1976) (sentence vacated
where trial judge gave defense counsel report for only a brief period of time, trial
judge had not presided over the trial and was presumed to rely heavily on the
report); United States v. Read, 534 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1976) (sentence vacated when
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decisions have ever squarely held that the due process clause requires that
the defendant or his counsel see the report. Most cases were decided under
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which left the decision to the
trial judge's discretion. 3 The applicable rule has recently been amended,3 2
and now requires disclosure in most cases, all but eliminating the con-
troversy in federal courts.
33
As a result of the rather cursory treatment given the issue by the
courts, there is little discussion to be found in the case law concerning the
rationale underlying the decision whether the presentence report should be
made available to the defendant, or at least to his counsel. The subject has
received extensive attention, however, in law journals by both proponents
and opponents of disclosure.
trial judge relied on information not in the presentence report and not part of record
for review); United States v. Picard, 464 F.2d 215 (ist Cir. 1972) (presentence
report's substance should be made known to the defendant); United States v.
Janiec, 464 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1972) (defendant has constitutional right to disclosure
of list of prior convictions upon request).
31. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2). This rule stated in pertinent part: "The Court
before imposing sentence may disclose to the defendant or his counsel all or part of
the material contained in the report of the presentence investigation and afford an
opportunity to the defendant or his counsel to comment thereon." (emphasis
supplied).
32. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3):
(A) Before imposing sentence the court shall upon request permit the
defendant, or his counsel if he is so represented, to read the report of the
presentence investigation exclusive of any recommendation as to sentence, but
not to the extent that in the opinion of the court the report contains diagnostic
opinion which might seriously disrupt a program of rehabilitation, sources of
information obtained upon a promise of confidentiality, or any other informa-
tion which, if disclosed, might result in harm, physical or otherwise, to the
defendant or other persons; and the court shall afford the defendant or his
counsel an opportunity to comment thereon and, at the discretion of the court,
to introduce testimony or other information relating to any alleged factual
inaccuracy contained in the presentence report.
(B) If the court is of the view that there is information in the presentence
report which should not be disclosed . . . , the court in lieu of making the
report or part thereof available shall state orally or in writing a summary of the
factual information contained therein to be relied on in determining sentence,
and shall give the defendant or his counsel an opportunity to comment thereon.
(Emphasis supplied). (As amended Apr. 22, 1974, effective Dec. 1, 1975).
33. For a good discussion of FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c) and the newer FED. R.
CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(A) & (B), see Note, Disclosure of Presentence Reports in Federal
Court: Due Process and Judicial Discretion, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1527, 1544-50 (1975).
For an excellent discussion of federal and state court practices, see Lehrich, The




Five major arguments have been advanced by those who oppose
disclosure. First, opponents claim, disclosure will result in a "drying up"
of sources of information. The second argument considers the need to
protect the defendant and others, such as the suppliers of the information,
to outweigh the need for disclosure. Third, the non-disclosure camp
argues that disclosing such information will disrupt the rehabilitative
process by damaging the rapport between the defendant and the investigat-
ing probation officer. Additionally, it is said that the defendant could
suffer from being forced to look at what others think of him. The final
argument against disclosure envisions long delay in the sentencing pro-
ceeding caused by the requirement of a complete new hearing on the
information contained in the report."
On the other side, proponents of disclosure argue that there is no
indication of any substantial drying up of sources or of any unnecessary
delay in jurisdictions where disclosure is the general rule. 35 Those favor-
ing disclosure point to the fact that there are much less drastic means of
protecting the defendant and informants, such as preserving the confiden-
tiality of the informer or making partial disclosure. The primary argument
for disclosure, however, is that the need for reliability outweighs the need
for availability of information. 36
In the instant case, the State of Florida presented essentially the same
arguments that opponents of disclosure had maintained over the years.
Writing a plurality opinion in which Justices Stewart and Powell joined,
Justice Stevens first distinguished Williams v. New York on two grounds.
First, it was noted, the defendant in Williams had been given an opportu-
nity to challenge the accuracy of the presentence report when the trial
judge recited the factual details it contained. Justice Stevens also relied
upon Justice Black's recognition of the Court's obligation to re-examine
capital sentencing procedures in light of the evolutionary nature of due
34. See generally Barnett & Gronewold, Confidentiality of the Presentence
Report, 26 FED. PROB. 26 (March, 1962); Parsons, The Presentence Investigation
Report Must be Preserved as a Confidential Document, 28 FED. PROB. 3 (March,
1964); Roche, The Position for Confidentiality of the Presentence Investigation
Report, 29 ALB. L. REV. 206 (1965); Sharp, The Confidential Nature of Presentence
Reports, 5 CATH. U. L. REV. 127 (1955).
35. See note 54, infra.
36. See generally Bach, The Defendant's Right of Access to Presentence Re-
ports, 4 CRIM. L. BULL. 160 (1968); Higgins, Confidentiality of Presentence Re-
ports, 28 ALB. L. REV. 12 (1964); Lehrich, supra note 33; Wyzanski, A Trial
Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1952); Note, Pro-




process. However, it should be noted that Justice Stevens might have gone
much further in distinguishing Williams, for, although the case has been
given a broad interpretation over the years, the only issue was whether the
trial judge could properly consider the presentence report at all. 37 Nowhere
in the Williams opinion did Justice Black express the view that the
defendant had no right at least to be informed of the report's contents.
Given the opportunity to explain the true holding in Williams, the plurality
should not have restricted itself to such a narrow distinction.
Satisfied with this limited distinction, however, the plurality opinion
turned to other issues, pointing out that five of the Justices presently on the
Court distinguish the death penalty from all other forms of punishment 38
and that the due process clause is applicable to the sentencing stage of
criminal proceedings. 39 Having laid this groundwork, the plurality con-
sidered the justifications offered by the State for withholding the pre-
sentence report.
In reply to the argument that disclosure will dry up sources, Justice
Stevens pointed out that quality as well as quantity must be considered
and that, in a capital case, the interest in the reliability of the information
outweighs that of its availability, since the chances of the defendant's
being sentenced to death on the basis of erroneous information are obvi-
ously greater when he has no chance to challenge the report. The argument
that disclosure will cause unnecessary delay was dismissed with a sugges-
tion that disputed material simply be disregarded by the trial court unless
the matter is of vital importance, in which case the time is well spent
37. As Justice Stevens noted, the defendant in Williams was apprised of the
information in the report. This was not at issue, though much discussion of the
merits of the report was contained in the case. In Williams, the Court only rejected
the notion that a complete second trial with cross-examination of witnesses and full
procedural rights was necessary. In concluding, Justice Black stated, "We cannot
say that the due process clause renders a sentence void merely because a judge gets
additional out-of-court information to assist him in the exercise of this awesome
power of imposing the death sentence." 337 U.S. at 252. See also text at note 25,
supra. For additional support for the proposition that Williams does not stand for
what it has been interpreted to say, see Bach, supra note 36, at 167-68; Guzman,
Defendant's Access to Presentence Reports in Federal Criminal Courts, 52 IowA L.
REV. 161, 172 (1966); Higgins, supra note 36, at 20. See also United States v.
Dockery, 447 F.2d 1178, 1189 (D.C. Cir.) , cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971) (Wright,
J., dissenting); United States v. Picard, 464 F.2d 215, 218-19 n.4 (1st Cir. 1972).
38. 97 S. Ct. at 1204. Cited by Justice Stevens were Justices Stewart, Powell
and Stevens (plurality opinion in Gregg v. Georgia); Justice Marshall (dissenting in
Furman v. Georgia); and Justice Brennan (concurring in Furman).
39. Id. at 1205. Justice Stevens pointed out, however, that the fact that due
process applies does not bring into play all the procedural guarantees that are
required at trial. Id. at 1206 n.9.
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because the defendant's life hangs in the balance. As for the claim that
disclosure will disrupt the rehabilitative process, Justice Stevens con-
cluded that this argument has no merit in a capital case, where the
possibility of rehabilitation is extinguished. Moreover, the opinion rea-
soned, a fear of disrupting rehabilitation would not justify withholding the
report from counsel. Finally, in response to the argument that the trial
judge can be trusted not to abuse his discretion in allowing the defendant to
see the report, the Court simply stated that this argument was foreclosed
by Furman.
The plurality also reasoned that even if withholding the report in
some circumstances were permissible, there would be no excuse for not
making the entire report a part of the record so that it could be reviewed on
appeal such a failure would result in the same infirmities found in Fur-
man, because the reviewing court would have no way of knowing what
factors motivated the sentencing authority to believe that death was the
appropriate punishment.4 ° Finally, the plurality stated that the failure of
counsel to request the full report was not a waiver of the constitutional
error.4 Thus, the Court concluded that the petitioner had been denied due
process of law when he was sentenced to death, at least in part, on the
basis of confidential information which he could not rebut.42
In a concurring opinion, Justice White asserted that the decision
should rest solely on Woodson v. North Carolina and the eighth amend-
ment.43 Quoting extensively from Woodson," he concluded that this case
40. Id. at 1206.
41. Id. The Court gave four reasons: (1) the state did not urge that there had
been a waiver; (2) the Florida Supreme Court had considered its duty to be to
consider the total record; (3) since two members of the Florida Supreme Court had
considered -the issue, it was presumed the whole court had passed on it; (4) there
was no basis for presuming a "knowing and intelligent" waiver. Moreover, the
Court noted that since the trial judge disagreed with the jury as to the existence of
mitigating circumstances, and the only material which the trial judge had that was
not before the jury was the presentence report, a full review was required. Id. at
1206-07.
42. Id. at 1207. The Court remanded the case to the Florida Supreme Court
with instructions to order further proceedings at the trial court level. Id. at 1207. In
the view of the plurality, merely making the confidential portion of the report part
of the record to be reviewed by the Florida high court would not fully correct the
error.
The plurality had also refused to inspect the confidential part of the report,
which had been included in the State's brief, stating, "It is not the function of this
Court to evaluate in the first instance the possible prejudicial impact of facts and
opinions appearing in a presentence report." Id. at 1203 n.5.
43. Id. at 1208 (White, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 1207.
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"fails to meet the 'need for reliability in the determination that death is the
appropriate punishment' which the court indicated was required in Wood-
son." 45 He objected to the use of the due process clause except as a
vehicle for imposing the eighth amendment on the states, apparently for
fear that the case would serve as precedent for holding that the due process
clause requires disclosure of the presentence report in non-capital as well
as capital cases.
This fear is well-founded, for the reasoning of the plurality opinion in
refuting the state's arguments applies equally well to non-capital cases.
Although Justice Stevens was careful to qualify his statements, reminding
the reader that the case is a capital one, the logic of his arguments against
non-disclosure is no less forceful when the defendant is facing a substan-
tial prison term. 46 Of course, the fact that this was a death penalty case
adds great weight to the argument for disclosure, but one cannot help
wondering why Justice White's view was not adopted by the plurality if
this were to be merely another procedural problem limited to capital
cases-after all, the introduction of procedural guarantees into the eighth
amendment's ban on "cruel and unusual" punishments had already been
accomplished in Furman and its successors. The fact that the due process
clause was used rather than the eighth amendment could be an indication
that the Court might extend the holding to non-capital sentencing proceed-
ings in a future case. 4
7
45. Id. at 1208.
46. On the secrecy of information, for example, Justice Stevens noted: "Assur-
ances of secrecy are conducive to the transmission of confidences which may bear
no closer relation to fact than the average rumor or item of gossip . . . .The risk
that some of the information accepted in confidence may be erroneous, or may be
misinterpreted, by the investigator or by the sentencing judge, is manifest." Id. at
1205. Certainly this argument has no less weight when the defendant is facing a
sentence short of death. Also, the plurality felt that the likelihood of significant
delay is overstated (id.); this appears so regardless of the potential punishment.
Further, the opinion's refutation of the argument that disclosure will disrupt the
rehabilitative process seems less than certain that such disruption will occur in any
case. Id. at 1206. Only the argument that trial judges can be trusted in their
discretion was dismissed primarily on the grounds of the peculiarities of capital
punishment, and even here the Court recognized the importance of having adver-
sary proceedings to ferret out the truth. Id. It appears now that, having made such a
strong case for disclosure, the Court may now have trouble not recognizing its
validity in all cases.
47. For this reason, the dissenting opinions by Justices Brennan and Marshall
are extremely important, for while each dissented on the basis of his belief in the
unconstitutionality of the death penalty per se, each also expressly stated that he
agreed with the plurality opinion's statement that a defendant facing a death
sentence is denied due process when the sentence is imposed, at least in part, on the
basis of confidential information.
19771
236 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38
Another factor which suggests that the Court might use the rationale
in deciding future cases is the assertion that due process applies to the
sentencing proceeding48 and that sentencing is a critical stage at which the
defendant is entitled to counsel .49 This raises the question whether counsel
can be effective in assuring that the defendant is not sentenced on the basis
of erroneous information if neither counsel nor the defendant is entitled to
the presentence report.5" It has long been held that sentencing the defend-
ant on the basis of false information violates due process, 5 but cases have
also consistently held that the defendant has no constitutional right to
know what is in the presentence report.52 Only those who have been lucky
enough to discover the report's contents have been able to appeal success-
fully.5 3 Thus the defendant is given a right which has, in practical effect,
48. 97 S. Ct. at 1205.
49. Id. at 1205. In making this statement, the Court relied on Mempa v. Rhay,
389 U.S. 128 (1967).
50. "Since counsel is powerless to correct errors of which he is unaware,
nondisclosure would appear to be the equivalent, in practical effect, to lack of
counsel. It would seem anomalous to hold that although a sentence based upon
erroneous information which counsel could correct violates due process, counsel
need not be given access to the information." Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d
599, 613 (9th Cir. 1968) (separate opinion of Browning, J.) (footnote omitted).
51. See Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948). In this case the sentence was
vacated because it appeared that the trial court had either relied on misinformation
or had misread the report, and because the defendant had no counsel to correct the
error. Lack of counsel cannot be the basis for the decision, since at the time, there
was no right to counsel in a non-capital case. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942),
overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Sharing this view are
United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1061
(1972); United States v. Malcolm, 432 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1970); Baker v. United
States, 388 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1968); Higgins, supra note 36, at 20.
52. See cases cited in note 29, supra.
53. Higgins, supra note 36, at 27: "The essential vice of the practice of
nondisclosure is that, because it is self-insulative, the extent of error that creeps
into the reports is virtually incapable of ascertainment." For an extreme example of
the injustice known to have occurred, see State v. Pohlabel, 61 N.J. Super. 242, 160
A.2d 647 (App. Div. 1960), where the defendent was sentenced to a term of twenty-
one to thirty-five years after having written checks totalling $1,467 from a check-
book he had stolen. Id. at 649. After serving eight years the defendant learned the
contents of the presentence report in which he had been called a "master of
deception"; it was alleged that he had "spent the greater part of his life in penal
institutions"; and implied that he had numerous prior convictions, including a life
term for escape from a California prison. Id. at 650-51. As it turned out, he had only
one prior conviction, auto theft, for which he had served four years, and this had
occurred when he was eighteen. Id. at 649. After serving nine years for his
conviction, the sentence was reduced when the prosecutor, informed of the discre-
pancy, joined in a motion to reduce the sentence. See also State v. Killian, 91 Ariz.
140, 370 P.2d 287 (1962).
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no substance: he has the right to be sentenced only on the basis of accurate
information, but he has no opportunity to question the accuracy of the
statements, since he has no right to know what they are.
However, perhaps the greatest argument favoring disclosure is sim-
ply that in those jurisdictions which have allowed disclosure, the deleteri-
ous results feared by those who oppose the practice have not materialized.
There has apparently been no cognizable drying up of sources, nor any
significant increase in the time necessary to conduct sentence hearings.
54
Moreover, the third major argument of opponents of disclosure, the need
to protect the defendant andthe informants, only refutes giving the entire
report to the defendant, and does not militate against either disclosing the
report to defendant's counsel, or even submitting to the defendant an
edited version which withholds the sources' identities.
Still another factor which supports disclosure is the very nature of the
information contained in the report, which lends itself to error and distor-
tion. 55 Much of the information is hearsay, and is elicited from sources
which should not be presumed reliable. Moreover, the investigator who
prepares the report is not necessarily in an objective position and, because
54. See Higgins, supra note 36. Higgins conducted a poll, sending question-
naires to 345 judges and obtaining 168 responses. Of these, 75 judges indicated a
practice of nondisclosure, 52 gave excerpts, and 41 indicated disclosure. Id. at 15-
16. Higgins found that: "None of the judges who maintained a practice of disclos-
ure . . . complained of their sources of information drying up." Id. at 31. Higgins
also noted that none of the judges who disclosed complained of the proceedings
becoming unduly protracted. In fact, some of the judges found that disclosure
permitted the scope of the proceedings to be limited to the pertinent issues, thus
reducing the chances of delay: "The observation was often made that one of the
most salutory experiences . . . is that it provoked responses, attitudes, opinions
and suggestions which are valuable to the court. . . . It was indicated that, beyond
the advantage of having erroneous data ferreted out and the defendant given the
opportunity to explain matter contained in the report, defendant and his counsel
often have pertinent information that does not appear in the report .... ."Id. at
32. See also Lehrich, supra note 33, at 239. "It should be pointed out that if defense
counsel does not have access to the presentence report, then he must present his
own presentence report, thereby prolonging the court process-the very thing the
court wants to avoid." Bach, supra note 36, at 165.
55. "The danger might not be so great if the presentence report detailed only
public, objective, easily verifiable information, such as the prior criminal record.
But, in fact, the typical report goes at great depth into very subtle, private,
subjective matters . . . . And even more fraught with danger is the report's
commentary on the defendant's family life, personal habits and psychological
condition. Most of this information is gained from associates of the defendant and
other informants who may have any number of personal axes to grind and limited
commitment to factual accuracy." United States v. Dockery, 447 F.2d 1178, 1192
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (Wright, J., dissenting).
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of the typically heavy caseload, does not generally have the time to make
the report as complete as it could be. 56 Beyond this, since eighty to ninety
per cent of federal criminal cases and a substantial majority of state
criminal cases are decided by guilty pleas, 57 the presentence report be-
comes of vital importance, since the judge probably knows little if any-
thing about the defendant other than what is contained in the report.
Clearly, the interest of the defendant in being apprised of the facts upon
which he is being sentenced-not to mention the interest of the courts in
seeing that justice is fairly administered-weighs more heavily than the
fears maintained by those in opposition to disclosure, especially since the
feared results have not materialized in the jurisdictions which allow
disclosure. Due process has been held to require as much in other set-
tings. 58
Perhaps Gardner will prove to be the first step toward the Court's
holding that due process requires disclosure in all cases, or at least those
involving severe penalties. While it must be remembered that the instant
case involved the death penalty, and might easily be distinguished on this
basis to prevent any expansion of the holding to non-capital cases, it
should also be reemphasized that the basis for the decision was the due
process clause and not the eighth amendment, a factor which perhaps
indicates that the Court is willing to hold at some future time that due
process requires at least partial disclosure59 of the presentence report to the
56. See Bach, supra note 36, at 163; Guzman, supra note 37, at 166 ("Mere
knowledge of the fact that the report was to be made available to defense counsel
would itself promote greater accuracy on the part of the probation officer as well as
those supplying him with information."). For some examples of bias drawn from
presentence reports, see Evjen, Some Guidelines in Preparing Presentence Reports,
37 F.R.D. .111, 179 (1965).
57. Lehrich, supra note 33, at 227, citing from Newman, Pleading Guilty for
Consideration: A Study of Bargain Justice, 46 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 780 (1956).
58. See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959), a case dealing with the
revocation of a security clearance, in which Chief Justice Warren stated:
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence.
One of these is that where governmental action seriously injures an individual,
and the reasonableness of action depends on fact findings, the evidence used
to prove the Government's case must be disclosed to the individual so that he
has an opportunity to show that it is untrue. While this is important in the case
of documentary evidence, it is even more important where the evidence
consists of the testimony of individuals whose memory might be faulty or who,
in fact, might be perjurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness,
intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy. Id. at 496.
59. It is important to recognize that the plurality does seem to recognize that in
some cases nondisclosure, at least to the defendant personally, would be proper.
See 97 S. Ct. at 1206.
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defendant or counsel in a non-capital case. On the other hand, as the
plurality noted, five Justices, in fact the same five Justices supporting the
actual holding of the instant case, had in previous cases distinguished the
death penalty from all other forms of punishment. It is hoped that this
distinction, which brought much needed reforms to capital sentencing
procedures, will not be used to prevent similar and equally needed reforms
in the sentencing process for non-capital cases.
John A. Mouton III
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL: AN ALTERNATIVE TO MIRANDA
The accused surrendered on the advice of counsel, was arrested under
a warrant, arraigned, and committed to jail in one city for abducting a
child in another locality. Although his attorney advised him by telephone
not to make any statements to the police while being transported back to
the scene of the crime-and made an agreement with the police that no
interrogation would occur-the defendant made incriminating disclosures
during the trip after a police detective stated that "the parents of this little
girl should be entitled to a Christian burial." I Notwithstanding his objec-
tions to the admission of such evidence, the prisoner's conviction for first
degree murder was affirmed by the state supreme court, and he subse-
quently petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, securing relief in the federal
district court2 and in the Eighth Circuit.' The United States Supreme Court
affirmed in a 5-4 decision and held that the prisoner was denied his
constitutional right to the assistance of counsel under the sixth and four-
teenth amendments. The Court found that judicial proceedings had been
initiated against him before the start of the automobile trip, that the
prisoner had a right to legal representation during interrogation, that the
police detectives had in fact interrogated him during the return trip, and
that there was no reasonable basis for finding a waiver of the right to
counsel. Brewer v. Williams, 97 S. Ct. 1232 (1977).
One of the most difficult and controversial areas of American crimin-
al procedure today is the subject of pre-trial police interrogation of an
1. Brewer v. Williams, 97 S. Ct. 1232, 1236 (1977).
2. Williams v. Brewer, 375 F. Supp. 170 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
3. Williams v. Brewer, 509 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1974).
